The Efficiency Gains from Social Security Benefit -Tax Linkage by 1an J. Auerbach Laurence J. Kotlilcoff This paper examines the efficiency gains from linking marginal Social Security benefits to marginal Social Security payroll taxes. In the U.S. the current combined employer-employee OASI payroll tax rate is iO.1 percent.
Recent estimates suggest that the average marginal income tax rate is roughly 21 percent (Barro and Sahaskul (1983) ). If marginal OASI payroll taxes provided no marginal Social Security benefits or were incorrectly perceived to provide no marginal benefits, the effective marginal federal government taxation of labor supply would average roughly 38 percent. Since the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation rise as roughly the square of the tax rate, the Social Security payroll tax may be more than doubling the dead weight loss of labor income taxation.
In a fully funded Social Security System in which individual "tax" contributions were registered in individual accounts and paid out with market interest in old age, the government would simply be providing forced savings accounts for individuals, and, assuming no liquidity constraints, a dollar contributed to Social Security would be viewed as a dollar of saving, with no distortionary effect on labor supply. The linkage in this case, in present _0.
value, of marginal benefits in return for marginal contributions ("taxes") j dollar for dollar. While individual accounts and tightly linking marginal benefits to marginal taxes have often alleged to be incompatible with an unfunded, "pay as you go" Social Security system, such is not the case. Marginal linkage can be equal to, greater than, or less than dollar for dollar in either a funded or an unfunded system. Consider, for example, a fully funded system in which uniform benefits are paid independent of individual tax contributions. In this case the marginal linkage is zero; full funding requires only that each cohort's old age benefits equal the cohort's accumulated tax contributions. It does not require that individual cohort members view their own tax payments as effectively identical to payments to a personal saving account.
In an unfunded system the government can establish marginal linkage by simply specifying a benefit formula which, at the margin, provides X dollars in present value of additional benefits for each dollar of additional tax contribution, where X can exceed, equal, or be less than one. The fact that one's marginal benefits and, indeed, one's total benefits are financed by members of the next generation is of no concern in formulating individual optimal intertemporal consumption and labor supply decisions.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Social Security System is essentially completely unfunded, marginal benefit-tax linkage in the U.S. appears to be significantly greater than one for one for some groups (e.g., older married males with low lifetime earnings and whose wives never worked); for other groups (e.g., low earning wives who will collect dependent and survivor benefits on their husbands' accounts) the marginal linkage is zero. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1983) is the first systematic study of marginal benefit-tax linkage. This study shows that at least prior to 1917 the benefit formula provided a very significant return on marginal "tax" contribution to men in their early-60s.
Some rough estimates of marginal linkage that are updated to include the 1983 legislated changes to Social Security are presented below. While these actuarial calculations are not highly complicated, they require a clear understanding of Social Security's benefit formula, including its method of wage indexing, its early retirement actuarial redaction provisions, its dependent and survivor benefit provisions, and its rules concerning the number and choice of years of earnings entering the calculation of AIME (average indexed monthly earnings). Given the surprised reaction to Blinder, Gordon, and Wise's findings by students of Social Security (including the authors), it appears extremely unlikely that typical American workers are aware of the marginal benefits they can expect under current law in exchange for their marginal taxes. Since the calculation of even a rough estimate of this linkage is difficult, since Social Security neither provides such information on a systematic basis nor will calculate such a number on request, and since Social Security legislation is subject to future changes, typical workers may simply, if incorrectly, assume that the marginal linkage is zero. This paper studies the efficiency costs of zero linkage when dollar for dollar and, indeed, greater than dollar for dollar linkage is feasible. The analysis is based a fiscal policy simulation model (Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983a , l983b, 1983c , 1983d , 1985 , 1986 , Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) ). The model assumes life cycle saving behavior and rational expectations _)4_ (actually perfect foresight since there is no uncertainty). The version of the model used here includes an unfunded Social Security System and the financing of government expenditures through alternative progressive or proportional income taxes. In addition, there is a special fiscal institution, the lump sum redistribution authority (LSRA), that can redistribute resources in a non distortionary manner across generations. This fiscal agency is used in the model to decompose welfare changes from benefit-tax linkage into those arising from pure efficiency gains and those associated with policy-induced intergenerational redistribution.
Calculations based on the model suggest very sizeable potential efficiency gains from running linked rather than unlinked Social Security programs. Indeed, the efficiency gains from dollar for dollar linkage exceed, in our model, the efficiency gains available from switching from proportional income to proportional consumption taxation. The results are illustrative and should not he viewed as providing estimates for the U.S. However, if P1merican workers systematically underestimate actual marginal linkage, the results suggest that the efficiency of the U.S. fiscal structure could be greatly enhanced by providing, at a minimum, better information to workers about the marginal return on their payroll tax dollars, and at a maximum, by substantially increasing the extent of the marginal linkage. Assuming workers incorrectly believe that they receive nothing at the margin in return for Social Security taxes, then the model suggests that the efficiency gains from annual reporting of marginal benefit accrual could be as large as 1 percent of GNP on an annual basis, i.e., the possible efficiency gain is equivalent to a 1 percent larger -5-level of GNP this year and every year in the future.
The next section, II, contains rough estimates of marginal linkage in the U.S. system for young workers just entering the program. Section III describes how benefit-tax linkage alters effective labor income taxation. This description is conducted in the context of summarizing the basic eQuations of the simulation model and the method used to solve the model. Section IV presents the efficiency gains calculations, and Section V summarizes the paper's findings.
II. Senefit-Tax Linkage in the U.S. Social Security System Many of the elements determining benefit-tax linkage in the U.S. Social Security Systeni can be illustrated by considering the simple case of a twenty-year old in 1985 whose benefit formula is determined by the Social Security Act as amended in 1983. For simplicity assume that the worker never marries, retires at age 61 (the normal retirement age legislated for this worker), and dies at age 15. The worker's nominal wage rate is at age 20 and grows through time at rate (i+m)(1+g)(i±T)-i, where m is an individual-specific growth factor, g is the assumed constant economy-wide growth in real labor earnings, and r is the assumed constant inflation rate.
The present value of the individual's labor earnings plus Social Security benefits (PVR) is given by:
(1 + r) (1 + it) B(AIME)(1 + S 5=148 (i + r)(l + )S where r is the real interest rate, (l+r)(1+ii)-l is the nominal interest rate, and the function B(AIME) gives the initial age 6 nominal benefit calculated on the basis of the worker's AIMS. Since benefits, at least under current law, are indexed for inflation, nominal benefits rise at the rate of it each year. The income and OASI tax rates are given by T and it3, respectively. The term (1_T5/2) reflects the fact that the employer's half of the payroll tax is deductible from the income tax. Finally, L is the worker's supply of labor at
The function B(AIME) can be expressed as B(AIME) = a + b(AIMEx12), (2) where the constants a and b are determined by the workers' AIME bracket. There are three indexed AIME brackets. For workers in the lowest bracket b equals .90, b equals .32 for workers in the middle bracket, and it equals .15 for those wnose juu is in trie nignest nracket.
The formula for AIME is given in (3). It takes into account the fact that wage indexation occurs only up through age 60. Between ages 60 and 67 (unindexed) nominal earnings are entered into the average "indexed" monthly earnings calculation. 
where the formula relating age to s is age=20+s. Prior to age 33 when s = 13, the benefit tax linkage is zero, and te,s=Ty(1_Ts/2)+Ts• The bracketed terms on the right-hand side of (5) and (6) give the effect of benefit linkage in reducing the effective taxation of labor supply. Stated differently this is the marginal payroll tax offset due to linkage. If g = r = TI = 0 the offset equals bD/38 independent of age. Positive values of it lower the offset and thus raise the effective tax rate at all ages prior to 67 because of the nori-indexation of earnings between ages 60 and 67. Higher values of g raise the offset and thus lower effective tax rates prior to age 61, when indexation ceases, with the biggest reduction in effective tax rates occurring at young ages (prior to age 32). This reflects the fact that earnings in early years are given more weight in the AIME calculation the bigger the wage growth indexation factor. Larger values of r lower the offset factor and thus raise effective taxes; since D declines with r, when r rises the present value of the marginal Social Security benefits earned with marginal tax contributions declines. The decline is, naturally, larger at younger ages. more than doubles the offset factors at age 32. ks suggested by eQuations (5) and (6) A final point indicated by the table is that at least when r>g, which seems the historically relevant case (see Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) ), the offsets rise significantly with age. In the case r=.04, g=.03, 1T.05 the offsets are zero prior to age 32 and then jumps to .066 when b=.90, to .023 when b=.32, and to .011 when b=..15. The offsets more than double between age 32 and 67'. This feature would appear to reinforce the distortion arising under the capital income tax that leads workers to substitute leisure when young for leisure when old.
The simulation model described in the following sections abstracts from age-related changes in the marginal-tax offsets with the exception of those associated with transitional changes in the Social Security tax rate. Given the apparently very poorly understood general level of these offests, let alone their patterns with age, and given the added complexities of modeling agevarying offsets, the simulation analysis is confined to describing the efficiency gains from benefit-tax linkage that results in age-invariant offsets.
Presumably, if in light of the potentially large efficiency gains from benef ittax linkage, Congress were to legislate changes in Social Security that made explicit benefit-tax linkage (see Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven (1982) for an example of a proposed benefit-tax linked restructuring of Social Security)), such legislation would also likely eliminate the anonomalous pattern of offsets with age exhibited by the current system.
lit. Simulating the Efficiency Gains from Benefit -Tax Linkage
The simulation model used to study the effects of social security benefit-tax linkage is a general equilibrium life-cycle growth model with fiftyfive overlapping generations of households. There is a single production sector, and three government sectors, one responsible for general fiscal policy that levies an income tax, a separate, self-financing social security system, and a self-financing lump sum redistribution authority ( We next describe, in turn, the household, production, and government sectors, paying particular attention to the way Social Security enters the model.
Households
At any given time, the household sector comprises fifty-five overlapping generations of adults. Each year one generation dies and another takes its place. It is useful to think of these "new" adults as being twentyone years old with an expected age of death of seventy-five. As with other aspects of uncertainty found in the real world, lifetime uncertainty is not con-sidered in the model.
Individual tastes are assumed to he identical, with differences in behavior being generated entirely by differences in economic opportunities.
Hence , We restrict preferences by requiring that this utility function be time-separable and of the nested, constant elasticity of substitution form.
Time separability means that lifetime utility can be expressed as a function of individual functions of leisure and consumption in each period:
where c and are consumption and leisure in year t. It is also assumed here that the functions Ut( ) do not vary over time, so that Ut( ) = u( ). The nested CES form further restricts both functions, u( ) and TJ( ). The annual function takes the form:
while the lifetime function is written: In the absence of social security, the household's budget constraint depends only on current and future values of after-tax interest rates and wage rates. The requirement that the present value of lifetime consumption not exceed the present value of lifetime earnings is, in this case:
where r is the annual interest rate at age t, wt is the standardized wage rate at age t (the wage rate of a new adult), T is the average income tax rate that applies at age t, and e is an adjustment factor to allow for the fact that the household may earn more or less per hour at age t because of differences in skill levels among households of different ages. One may think of the vector e, composed of values of et for all t, as the household's "human capital" profile, reflecting its change in earning capacity over time. It is taken as fixed from the household's viewpoint.
In addition to this overall budget constraint, one must impose the requirement that labor supply can never be negative. This is represented by the inequality constraints: 1 for all t
Accounting for Social Security
The social security system in the model assesses payroll taxes on individual households and gives them retirement benefits. Because it, like the actual U.S. system, is an unfunded, pay-as-you-go scheme, it will not generally give each generation, as a whole, an actuarially fair return on its contributions. Instead, each generation's benefits are financed by the tax payments of those younger generations still working. In the long run, this will result in retirees, as a group, receiving a rate of return equal to the growth rate of covered earnings, rather than the after-tax interest rate. This rate, in turn, will equal the sum of the growth rates of real wages and the labor force.3
Social security affects household behavior in the model through its appearance in the lifetime budget constraint. Expression (10) becomes:
where PVB equals the present value of lifetime Social Security benefits, and 6 equals payroll taxes paid at age t. In an unfunded system, as in a funded system, the government is free to specify a formulae that relates Social Security benefits to lifetime labor earnings. The fact that, as a long run proposition, the return paid by Social Security on tax contributions equals the economy's growth rate places some restrictions on the generosity of the benefit formula, at least in the long run. It does not, however, restrict the design of the benefit formula at the margin. Table 1 illustrates for the actual U.S.
system that, at the margin, benefit formulae can be designed such that a dollar of tax payments generates, at the margin, more or less than a dollar in present value of benefits. In this paper we consider the following linear formula relating the present value of benefits (PvB) received by generation i to the present value of its Social Security taxes (PvT.).
FVB. =
÷ X1PVT
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PVT 
where C is consumption, W is the wage rate, 9. is leisure, 0 is the payroll tax rate, and B is the Social Security benefit. Now let B = a + x(Ow(i-2J). In the figure budget line AA is the case of no Social Security and permits a maximum utility of TJ. Budget line ADD is the case in which a fixed benefit, a:, equal to the distance DA, is provided independent of the amount of payroll taxes paid, i.e., A0. The utility level obtained in this case is U1, and the reduction in private resources associated with the benefit tax program is AE; i.e., the Social Security program depicted in Figure 1 is not actuarially fair since AE =
The budget line AF also leaves the government collecting AE in net resources from the private sector, but permits utility of U2. The difference in utility U2_U1 is the efficiency gain from switching from an unlinked benefit formula in which cx > 0 and X = 0, to a linked formula in which a = 0 and X > 0.
18-
In this case X is set such that W(1-Z2)O(i_X) = AE. Since 5 will, in general, depend on X, this expression will, in general, be a non-linear equation in X.
Given the solution to this equation, X, the government simply announces it will pay X dollars in benefits for every dollar paid in taxes. Optimizing behavior on the part of atomistic workers leads each to supply units of leisure proviling the government with sufficient tax receipts to pay benefits equal to the preannounced X times these tax receipts with AE left over for its other expen-
The budget line EE represents the first best method of collecting AE.
In this case the government announced that G = -AE and sets X = 1. This is, of course, identical to levying a lump sum tax, which may seem infeasible.
Suppose, however, the government disquises this lump sum tax by announcing a benefit formula with the following characteristics. There is a minimum benefit > 0 plus an additional benefit equal to X times the amount of taxes paid in excess of ct*. If X is set equal to one, and cr* and are choosen such that -= = -AE, then the budget line is AGGE which, in terms of the worker's marginal choice behavior, is effectively equivalent to the budget line EE.
Certainly "a minimum benefit coupled with higher benefits for tax payments in excess of a threshold value" sounds more feasible politically although it is really not different from a lump sum tax.
The addition of an income tax to this one period model raises the possibility of choosing X > 1 in order also to eliminate the distortion from the income tax. If Ty is the income tax, setting X = (e+Ty)/e leaves the effective tax on labor supply equal to zero. Figure 1 can now be reinterpreted to repre-sent both the case of payroll and income taxation. The slopes of DD and GG in this case are equal to W(1-T_O) and the budget frontier AGGE results from the government announcing a minimum benefit of a plus X = (8+T)/B in additional benefits for each dollar paid in taxes above a.
Unlike the non-convex budget constraint AGGD, the U.S. system may look, at least for some workers, more like the convex budget set ARID, where along the segment AR (corresponding to the first AIME bracket) the effective tax rate is negative, it is positive, but small along HI (the second AIME bracket), and it is substantial along ID (the third AIME bracket). In considering the simulation findings it may be useful to keep in mind the values of X that would arise in the U.S. if the actual U.S. benefit formula were replaced by benefit formula (13), with a. set equal to zero and set equal to PVT/PVB. Table 2 based on 
Determination of Equilibrium Transition Values of Social Security's Benefit
Formula Parameters and Tax Rates
In the simulations conducted in this study we examine (i) the case of setting a = 0 for all i, and = PVB/PVT, and (2) the case of setting a. = PVB.
-XPVT, where X is set equal to either 1 or for all generations. The baseline from which these benefits formulae are evaluated is the economy's initial steady state in which a = PVB, and X = 0. where fl is the population growth rate, is the year t Social Security tax rate, a indexes age, Zt,a is the leisure of a worker age a at time t, and Bt,a is the benefit received by a Social Security beneficiary age a in year t.
For simplicity let us assume that each beneficiary's benefit remains constant between ages )6 through 55, i.e., = t+s,6+s' given. Also assume that either the sequences of or are set exogeneously according to the policy experiments (i) and (2) described above. If the time paths of W, rt, Tt,a and 9.t,a (which depends on 't-a were also given, this sequence of equations could be used to solve for the endogenous sequence of either at or X. In the simulation model this sequence of equations plus other equations determing W, rt, Tt,a and are solved simultaneously. Actually, the values of the time path of the Social Security tax rates, the t' are also endogenously determined. The time path of tax rates is set equal to that which would be required to finance monthly benefits for each successive generation equal to 60 percent of its average indexed monthly earnings (AIMs). This choice for setting the time path of Social Security tax rates ensures that the general scale of the system is not affected by the particular formula choosen that links individual benefits to individual taxes. Equation (20) (i+rt) a=146 (l+ri) where AIMEta is the level of AIME over the 145 year work span for the cohort that is age a in year t.
Having described the inclusion of the Social Security System, we turn to a brief description of the production sector as well as the model's treatment of the government's non-Social Security fiscal policy.
Firm Behavior
The model has a single production sector that is assumed to behave competitively, using capital and labor subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production function. Capital is assumed to be homogeneous and nondepreciating, while labor differs only in its efficiency. That is, all forms of labor are perfect substitutes, hut individuals of different ages supply different amounts of some standard measure of labor input per unit of leisure foregone. This amount is the term et for age cohort t, introduced above.
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form: (21) Yt = AK where Y, Kt, and Lt are output, capital, and labor at time t, A is a scaling constant, and is a parameter measuring the factor share of capital in production. A is assumed to be constant over time, thereby ruling out the possibility of technological change.4
Competitive behavior on the part of firms insures that the marginal products of labor and capital are set equal to their respective factor returns, w and r.
Government Behavior
The government in this model raises income taxes to pay for its own consumption of goods and services which is assumed to grow at the same rate as the population. In addition, there is a separate social security system, already described, plus a self-financing redistribution branch, the LSRA, that is included for the sole purpose of disentangling the distributive and eff iciency effects of various policies.
In financing its consumption, the government in this analysis uses either a proportional or a progressive income tax. In the case of progressive income tax marginal rates are linearly related to income. We assume that the main fiscal authority's budget is balanced in each year, so that there is no national debt and government spending equals income tax collections.
When the LSRA is used to redistribute intergenerationally, it
The LSRA assesses a lump sum tax (which may be negative) on each generations, subject to the constraint that the present value of these lump sum taxes equals The efficiency gain is measured as the percentage increase in the present value of full time earnings required to raise the welfare of individuals living in the initial (X = 0) steady state to that uniform welfare level received by all new generations under one of the three benefit-tax linked formulae. In the case that X = PVB/PVT, and government consumption is financed by an income tax, the efficiency gain is 1.3 percent of full lifetime resources.
Since a new generation is born each year, the efficiency gain is equivalent, in present value, to an annual stream equal to 1.3 percent of full lifetime earnings. The present value of actual lifetime earnings in the initial steady state is somewhat more than one half of full lifetime earnings; the efficiency gain is over 2.4 percent of the present value of actual lifetime earnings (or lifetime consumption since the two are equal). Measured as a percent of GNP, the efficiency gain is equivalent to permanently increasing GNP by .18 percent.
To put the 1.3 percent figure in further perspective, one can compare it to the comparable efficiency gain associated with a switch from a proportional income tax to a proportional consumption tax. The gain from such a policy is 5.3 percent of full lifetime resources.5 Hence, the gain from proportional benefit-tax linkage (A = PVB/PVT) is about one fourth of that available from switching to a consumption tax.
The final steady state value of A in this simulation equals .13, and the final steady state payroll tax rate is 9.8 percent. Since the final steady state income tax rate is .29, proportional benefit-tax linkage lowers the effective tax rate from an initial steady state value of 39.8 percent to a final steady state value of 31.4 percent. !ote that this simulated value of A is much smaller than those reported in Table 2 , reflecting in part the model's higher real interest rate.
Setting A 1 or A = 4 produces strikingly large efficiency gains, 7.6 percent and 12.8 percent, respectively! The effective tax rate in the former case is reduced from 39.8 percent to 26.9 percent. In the latter case the effective tax is lowered from 39.8 percent to -7.1 percent; i.e., the benefittax linkage when A = is sufficiently large to more than fully offset both the payroll tax and the income tax, leaving a net effective subsidy to labor supply in the final steady state.
As one would expect the efficiency gains from benefit tax linkage are larger still if a progressive rather than a proportional income tax is being used to finance the same level of government consumption as under the proportional income tax. In the initial steady state the marginal tax rates associated with the progressive tax rate schedule (22) are 40 percent at age zero (age 20), 50 percent at age 24 (age 45), 31 percent at age 50 (age 70), and 25 percent at age 55 (age 75) The efficiency gains reported in Table 2 from benefit-tax linkage in the presence of this progressive income tax are 2 percent for A = PVB/PVT, 15.1 percent for A = 1, and 26.5 percent for A =
. easured as a percent of GNP these figures are 1.2 percent, 9.1 percent, and i6.o percent. Table 4 contains information about the stock of capital and the supply of labor for the six economies referenced in Table 1 . The first thing to notice from this table is that the initial steady state capital stock and labor supply under the progressive tax regime are significantly smaller (30 percent and 9 percent, respectively) than under the proportional tax regime. P second feature is that when A = 1 and A = 4 benefit-tax linkage significantly increases the supply of labor, particularly at the early stages of the transitions. The linkage, coupled with the LSRA's tax-transfer policy, leads to substantial long run increases in the capital stock when A = 1 or A = 4. In the case of the progressive income tax when A = 4, the capital stock increases by a factor of 2.7! In viewing these numbers it should be understood that the parameterization of the model is fairly conservative with respect to the extent of substitution possibilities between consumption and leisure both at a point in time and over time. The significant substitution effects underlying the results of Table   3 appear to reflect the substantial changes in the relative price of leisure that occurs when A is set to 1 and especially when A is set to 4.
-28- Table 5 shows for the case of X = 1 how the LSRA affects the results.
Note that without the LSRA, as with the LSRA, the economy's transition path involves a pareto improvement. The reduced long run welfare gain with no LSRA relative to that with the LSRA (1.5 percent rather than 7.6 percent) reflects the improved welfare of those generations who are initially alive at the time the ) = 1 benefit-tax linkage policy is implemented. The capital stock is also larger with the LSRA since the LSRA must tax initial generations to lower their welfare to the value it would have attained in the absence of the new policy.
These taxes lower the consumption of such early generations, accounting for the larger accumulated saving.
V. Conclusions
The findings of this paper suggest that there may be very significant efficiency gains available from tightening the connection between marginal Social Security taxes paid and marginal Social Security benefits received.
Indeed, the simulated efficiency gains are very large in comparison with those obtained from analyses of the gains from structural tax reform. Restructuring Social Security to greatly enhance marginal benefit-tax linkage may be infeasible, at least in the short run, However, the results suggest that simply providing annual reports under the current system indicating how a worker's projected benefits are affected by his or her tax contributions could provide a considerable increase in economic efficiency -perhaps as large as 1 percent of GNP on an annual basis.
-30-Footnotes 1. Suppose, as is typically the case, that the non-working or low earning spouse is the wife. The wife is entitled to collect dependent benefits equal to half of her husband's benefit while her husband is alive and 100 percent of the husband's benefit when he is dead. Since women live longer than men and wives are typically 2-3 years younger than their husband, the factor of 2 seems appropriate.
2. The parameter p, the elasticity of substitution between concurrent leisure arid consumption, determines how responsive an individual's annual labor supply response is to that year's wage rate. The term u represents the intensity of preference by the household for leisure relative to consumption. The greater is 1, the less labor the household will supply in order to obtain consumption goods, preferring a greater amount of leisure instead. The term 5 is the rate of time preference. The remaining taste parameter, ', equals the household's elasticity of substitution between consumption in different years, between leisure in different years, and between consumption and leisure in different years. The size of ' determines in part the responsiveness of households to changes in the incentive to save.
3. For example, consider the steady state of a two-period model in which the elderly generation receives benefits equal to the taxes of the younger generation. In this case, the benefits of the elderly will equal WyLyPy the product of the steady state Social Security tax rate, 8, times the steady state earnings of the younger generation which equals the steady state wage, times the labor supply per young person, L, times the population of young workers, P. The taxes previously paid by the elderly were OWy•LyP0/(1+g), where P0 is the population of elderly retirees, and g is the growth rate of wages. If the growth rate of population is ri, the elderly receive a return of (l+g)(1+n) on their taxes. Put another way, the present value of Social Security benefits equals (1+g)(l+n)/(1+r(l-r)) per dollar of payroll taxes.
4 It is generally impossible to include such change without also assuming continuous changes in tastes; otherwise the result would be either an increasing or decreasing trend in labor force participation, leading in the long run to an absurd result.
Peilechio, anthony J. and Gordon P. Goodfellow, "Individual Gains and Losses from Social Security Before and After the 1983 Social Security Amendments, mimeo, June 1983. As with the steady states, a Gauss-Seidel iteration algorithm is employed, but here the problem is 150 times larger since the years are solved for all at once. Aside from this greater complexity, a final difference in solving for the transition path as opposed to the initial steady state is that individuals alive at the time the policy is adopted must be treated differently.
While individuals born after the transition begins know the economic conditions that will confront them, those born before the beginning of the transition behave up to the time of the change in government policy as if the old steady 
3=.25
A is scaled so that the wage of a 21 year old equals 1 when there is no social security and the income tax is 15 percent. The vector e is based on wage profiles estimated by Welch (1979) . Further details are provided in Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) . .59
Source: Pellechio and Goodfellows, "Individual Gains and Losses from Social Security Before and After the 1983 Social Security Amendments," Table 7 . 
